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Of  the various ‘surprises’, three deserve note. First, National 
negotiated formal governance arrangements with three 
minor parties – ACT, United Future and the Mäori Party 
– and subsequently (in early April 2009) a ‘memorandum 
of  understanding’ with a fourth – the Greens. Yet one 
agreement – with ACT – would have sufficed. As it stands, 
the new government enjoys the support of  69 MPs on matters 
of  confidence and supply, giving it a majority of  16. 
Second, the agreements with ACT, United Future and 
the Mäori Party were modelled on the previous government’s 
highly unusual multi-party governance arrangements (White, 
2005). Yet Labour’s innovative arrangements were severely 
criticised by National at the time, with Don Brash, the party’s 
then leader, calling them ‘disturbing’, ‘odd’, ‘unstable’ and 
‘concerning from a constitutional point of  view’ (Brash, 2006). 
Third, National negotiated broadly similar – and, in 
structural terms, symmetrical – relationships with three of  the 
four parties with which it now has a formal, signed accord. 
Yet this symmetry was not essential politically, and Labour’s 
previous deals with minor parties (in 1999, 2002 and 2005) 
were all asymmetrical. 
How are these ‘surprises’ to be explained? This brief  article 
attempts to provide some answers. But first a few comments 
on the outcome of  the 2008 general election.
The 2008 general election
The results of  the five MMP elections to date are outlined in 
Table 1. As highlighted by these data (and as widely expected 
prior to the introduction of  proportional representation), no 
single party has thus far secured an overall parliamentary 
majority under MMP. National, however, performed 
remarkably well in 2008, securing 44.9% of  the party vote – 
the best result for a major party since 1990, and significantly 
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The general election on 8 November 2008 – the fifth under New Zealand’s 
mixed member proportional (MMP) voting system – marked the first 
substantial change of  government since 1999.2 The clear victory for the 
centre-right was unsurprising, especially given the results of  opinion polls 
during the preceding 12-18 months. Rather more unexpected, however, were 
the composition and structure of  the new government.
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better that Labour’s strong showing in 2002 (41.3%). With 
58 seats in the 122-seat Parliament, National is only four 
votes short of  an overall majority. 
More significantly, the 2008 general election produced a 
solid parliamentary majority for the centre-right. Collectively, 
the two centre-right parties (National and ACT) secured 63 
seats – thus giving them an overall majority of  four, and a 
much healthier majority of  10 over the combined 53 votes 
of  the three centre-left parties (Labour, the Greens and 
the Progressives). If  the single seat of  the relatively centrist 
United Future is also added to that of  National and ACT, the 
overall centre-right majority rises to six. While comfortable, 
this is only half  that of  the centre-left majority following the 
previous change of  government in 1999. Given the tendency 
for governments to lose electoral support, maintaining an 
overall centre-right majority at the next election, expected in 
2011, could be challenging – but is by no means impossible.
Crucially, the 2008 election placed National in the 
pivotal position amongst the Parliament’s seven parties. On 
the dominant socio-economic issue dimension (see Box 1), 
ACT is firmly entrenched on its right, with the other five 
parties located in varying positions to its left. In effect, this 
means that ACT is a so-called ‘captive’ party (i.e. it has no 
realistic political option other than to support National, and 
its bargaining position is weakened accordingly). Much the 
same configuration occurred between 1999 and 2005 (albeit 
in reverse). During this period, Labour occupied the position 
of  the median voter, with two ‘captive’ parties to its left – 
the Alliance (subsequently the Progressives) and the Greens. 
By contrast, the situation during 2005–08 was much more 
complicated, with neither of  the major parties occupying the 
median voter position. Instead, one (or more) of  three minor 
parties – New Zealand First, United Future and the Mäori 
Party – jostled for the pivotal role depending on the nature 
of  the policy issue under debate, with the Greens and the 
Progressives remaining, as previously, essentially captive to 
Labour.
The parliamentary arithmetic following the 2008 election 
was such that National could readily have formed a stable 
government solely with ACT – involving ACT either as a full 
coalition partner or as a party providing support on confidence 
and supply. In the event, neither option was seriously pursued. 
Instead, National chose to broaden its parliamentary base 
by drawing both the Mäori Party and United Future firmly 
into the fold, and subsequently negotiated a much looser 
working relationship with the Greens via a ‘memorandum 
of  understanding’ under which the two parties have agreed 
to ‘work together to develop policy and legislation in areas of  
common interest’ (see below). 
The move to embrace the Mäori Party and United 
Table 1: The state of the parties after the general elections from 1993 to 2008
PArTy 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
ACT -- 8 9 9 2 5
National 50 44 39 27 48 58
United (1996, 1999) 
United Future (2002, 2005, 2008)
-- 1 1 8 3 1
New Zealand First 2 17 5 13 7 --
Labour 45 37 49 52 50 43
Alliance 2 13 10 -- -- --
Progressive Coalition/Progressives -- --  -- 2 1 1
Greens -- -- 7 9 6 9
Mäori Party -- -- -- -- 4 5
Centre-right majority, including New 
Zealand First (1996)
Centre-left majority (1999, 2002)
Centre-left majority (2005)*
Centre-right majority, including ACT 
and United Future
 
1
 
20  
12
 
6  
1  
 
6
Total number of seats 99 120 120 120 121** 122***
Notes: 
 *  It is assumed that the centre-left parties in 2005 comprise Labour, the Progressives, the Greens and the Mäori Party. 
 **  The Mäori Party won four electorate seats in 2005, one more than its entitlement based on its party vote, thereby causing an 
‘overhang’. As a result, the total number of MPs increased to 121.
 ***  The Mäori Party won five electorate seats in 2008, two more than its entitlement based on its party vote, thereby causing an 
‘overhang’. As a result, the total number of MPs increased to 122.
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Future was of  some surprise, partly because it generated an 
‘oversized’ parliamentary majority on votes of  confidence 
and supply (i.e. neither the Mäori Party nor United Future 
were essential for a ‘minimum winning coalition’), and partly 
because of  a number of  sharp policy differences between 
National and the Mäori Party. How, then, is the inclusion of  
the two ‘surplus’ parties to be explained?
The political logic of an ‘oversized’ majority
In multi-party systems it is, in fact, relatively common for a 
major party to build a governing coalition across the middle 
of  the political spectrum, thereby expanding its potential 
majority beyond the minimum required to win parliamentary 
votes of  confidence and retain office. There are typically 
both short-term and longer-term reasons for adopting such 
a strategy. 
The short-term logic runs as follows: building across the 
centre renders the major party less reliant upon a ‘captive’ 
party (assuming there is one), thereby increasing the policy 
options available to the government. In the case of  National, 
there was plainly a desire to ensure that the new government 
could, on occasions, pursue policy objectives and legislative 
initiatives that ACT was unlikely to endorse (e.g. the 
implementation, albeit with modifications, of  Labour’s 
recently enacted emissions trading scheme). Having the 
opportunity to secure support, on certain legislative issues, 
from the Mäori Party (with five MPs) increases National’s 
options and gives it greater flexibility on controversial matters. 
Had the parliamentary arithmetic been different (e.g. had the 
combined votes of  National and the Mäori party fallen short 
of  a parliamentary majority), the incentive structure would 
likewise have been different. 
Forging a formal alliance with the Mäori Party had 
another important shorter-term logic: it provided National 
– which has much weaker historical links to Mäori than 
Labour – with the chance to build a more cross-cultural 
and multi-racial approach to governance. Given the ever-
present risk of  ethnic tensions and in the midst of  turbulent 
economic circumstances, a close working relationship with 
the Mäori Party was likely to strengthen National’s capacity 
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Box 1:  The relative power of parties and the 
‘dimensionality’ of the New Zealand party system
In a multi-party Parliament where no single party enjoys an overall 
majority, the bargaining power of each party depends primarily 
on its position along the key ideological or issue dimension (or 
dimensions) rather than on its actual size, heritage, experience 
or leadership. In a party system where there is a single dominant 
issue dimension (e.g. the socio-economic dimension), the most 
powerful or ‘pivotal’ party is typically the one located at the 
median point on that particular dimension. This is because the 
party representing the ‘median voter’ is a necessary component 
of all the politically feasible (or ‘connected’) minimum winning 
coalitions (Nagel, 1999a). In other words, it is very difficult 
(although not necessarily out of the question) to form a cohesive 
and durable government without including this particular party in 
the governing arrangements. It thus holds a veto (or very close to 
a veto) over which party, or combination of parties, can govern.
In New Zealand, the dominant issue dimension, and hence 
the main focus for inter-party debate and coalition building, 
still remains the long-standing left–right (or socio-economic) 
continuum (Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999). Accordingly, the party 
which occupies the median position on this dimension is in 
a strategically significant bargaining position. At the same 
time, several other issue dimensions are currently politically 
salient, thus giving New Zealand a multidimensional rather 
than unidimensional party system (see Nagel, 1999b). These 
include the materialist/post-materialist dimension (where the 
Greens have occupied a particular part of the policy space), the 
religious dimension (which has sparked various Christian-based 
political initiatives), and the ethno-cultural dimension (where the 
formation of the Mäori Party – in response to the controversy 
over the Labour-led government’s Foreshore and Seabed Act in 
2004 – has had a significant impact on New Zealand’s political 
landscape). Indeed, the relative success of the Mäori party 
(rendered possible largely as a result of there being a separate 
Mäori roll and related parliamentary seats) highlights the capacity 
of an ethnic-based party to secure electoral support on policy 
issues far removed from those that have traditionally galvanised 
political action. 
Multi-dimensionality in the party system can add significant 
complications to governing arrangements for at least two reasons. 
First, under proportional representation it generally results in 
a larger number of parties securing parliamentary seats. This 
not merely increases the potential governing options, but also 
exacerbates the transaction costs associated with forming and 
managing coalitions (whether of a legislative or executive nature). 
Second, it can lead to a situation where parties that are closely 
connected along one important issue dimension are strenuously 
opposed on another, thereby undermining collaboration. In New 
Zealand, such tensions were evident in mid-2002 (when serious 
strains between Labour and the Greens over the issue of genetic 
engineering contributed to the subsequent exclusion of the Greens 
from direct participation in the government) and again in 2005 
(when the divisions between Labour and the Mäori Party resulted 
in Labour seeking parliamentary support primarily from New 
Zealand First and United Future). The evolving multidimensional 
character of New Zealand politics has undoubtedly contributed 
to the unusual inter-party governance arrangements that have 
emerged, especially since 2005. But it is by no means the only 
policy driver.
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to manage complex and controversial policy issues connected 
to race (e.g. constitutional issues, socio-economic disparities, 
criminal justice, etc.) and enhance the wider project of  
nation-building.
There is also a longer-term logic for building broader 
parliamentary alliances under proportional representation. 
Put simply, it is in the political interests of  a major party to 
establish good working relationships with a party (or parties) 
that is likely to survive the next general election and whose 
support might then be needed in order to retain power. Both 
the Mäori Party and the Greens certainly fit into this category; 
United Future much less so, because the party’s electoral 
prospects at the next general election (due before the end 
of  2011) are not good. Nevertheless, Peter 
Dunne (United Future’s leader and sole 
MP) is widely regarded as an experienced 
parliamentarian, a competent minister 
and a ‘safe’ pair of  hands – qualities of  
high value for a new government relatively 
lacking in MPs with substantial ministerial 
experience. Also, having Dunne ‘inside the 
tent’ rather than as part of  the opposition 
had other political advantages.
For National, therefore, winning the 
support of  the Mäori Party offered a number 
of  potentially significant advantages – 
increasing its short-term legislative options, 
broadening its electoral appeal and legitimacy within certain 
communities, enhancing its capacity to manage complex 
ethnic and social cleavages, and making it more difficult 
for Labour to refashion its inter-party alliances and craft a 
potential post-2011 governing coalition. Moreover, the costs 
and risks appeared to be relatively low. As the negotiations 
immediately following the election highlighted, National had 
no need to make major policy concessions in order to secure 
the Mäori Party’s support (or indeed that of  United Future). 
Admittedly, the Mäori Party’s backing required abandoning 
a pledge to abolish the separate Mäori seats, but National’s 
commitment on this matter had never been non-negotiable; 
and an agreement to review the controversial Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004, but such a ‘review’, while involving political 
risks, is being conducted within certain agreed parameters. 
For the Mäori Party there were both advantages and 
disadvantages in aligning with National. On the positive 
side of  the ledger, there was the opportunity for the two co-
leaders (Pita Sharples and Tariana Turia) to hold ministerial 
posts and thereby directly influence policy making in specific 
areas of  concern to the party. Similarly, the party stood to 
gain its long desired review of  the foreshore and seabed 
legislation, additional electoral resources and various other 
concessions. Against this, there was an electoral risk: having 
hitherto drawn most of  its votes from the centre-left of  the 
political spectrum, the Mäori Party stood to lose support by 
aligning with National. Whether this electoral cost proves to 
be high or low remains to be seen.
National’s recent ‘memorandum of  understanding’ with 
the Greens is of  a different order from the immediate post-
election deals with ACT, United Future and the Mäori Party, 
since it does not entail the direct participation of  the Greens 
within the government; nor does it involve policy concessions 
by either side. The memorandum of  understanding is also 
different from the various ‘cooperation agreements’ that 
Labour negotiated with the Greens (see below). This is 
because it imposes fewer obligations on the respective parties, 
is more limited in its scope (e.g. in terms of  the range of  policy 
and procedural issues addressed), and has no implications 
for the way the Greens vote on matters of  confidence and 
supply. Instead, the memorandum of  understanding merely 
establishes a ‘framework’ for building a ‘working relationship’ 
between the two parties. In accordance with this framework, 
National has agreed to give the Greens access to ministers, 
officials and Cabinet papers from time to time in return 
for a relatively modest pledge by the Greens ‘to consider 
facilitating government legislation via procedural support on 
a case by case basis’. Under the memorandum, the parties 
have agreed to work together on three specific issues, at least 
in the first instance: home insulation, energy efficiency and 
the regulation of  natural health products. Overall, National’s 
move to engage with the Greens more formally on certain 
policy issues is consistent with its longer-term political 
strategy, namely to build good working relationships with 
minor parties on whom it might, at some future date, depend 
for support.
The development of novel multi-party governance 
arrangements 
The first ‘surprise’ outcome of  the 2008 general election – 
namely, National’s decision to draw not one, but three, minor 
parties into the governing process – is thus readily explicable 
given certain political considerations and imperatives. But 
what of  the other two ‘surprises’? Why did National replicate 
the inter-party arrangements of  the previous Labour 
government, arrangements that it had once vehemently 
criticised? And why did it negotiate essentially symmetrical 
deals with ACT, United Future and the Mäori Party, and thus 
eschew other possible governance arrangements, such as a 
formal coalition (perhaps with ACT)?  In order to answer 
these questions, it is necessary to consider two matters: first, 
The first ‘surprise’ outcome of the 2008 
general election – namely, National’s decision 
to draw not one, but three, minor parties 
into the governing process – is thus readily 
explicable given certain political considerations 
and imperatives.
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the different kinds of  inter-party deals that have been crafted 
since the adoption of  proportional representation; and 
second, the political rationale for the more unusual of  these 
arrangements. 
Since 1996, seven distinct kinds of  agreement between 
a major governing party and various minor parties (e.g. 
coalition partners, support parties or cooperating parties) 
can be identified (see Table 2). Broadly speaking, these 
reflect different levels of  ‘tightness’ in the relationships 
between the respective parties – from closely coupled and 
relatively binding relationships at one end of  the spectrum, 
to much looser and more flexible associations at the other 
(see Boston and Ladley, 2006). The first and fourth of  these 
arrangements are common in other multi-party systems, 
while the second, sixth and seventh occur from time to time. 
By contrast, the third and fifth arrangements are thus far 
unique to New Zealand. Both options were the product of  
the very complicated bargaining environment following the 
2005 election and the need for Labour to satisfy a variety 
of  conflicting imperatives in order to remain in office (see 
Boston, 2007). 
The development of  the ‘enhanced cooperation’ deal with 
the Greens reflected Labour’s desire to retain the support 
and goodwill of  this minor ‘captive’ party in a context 
where the Greens’ direct participation in the government 
had been vetoed by the two centrist parties – New Zealand 
First and United Future – whose backing Labour needed in 
order to secure a parliamentary majority. Strictly speaking, 
Labour could have governed without the Greens. But with a 
majority of  only one vote in the 121-seat Parliament, Labour 
concluded that it needed an ‘oversized coalition’ to give it 
flexibility and security for the duration of  the parliamentary 
term. Moreover, it recognised that it would need the Greens’ 
six votes in order to advance specific legislative initiatives 
where the support of  another minor party (or parties) was 
unlikely to be forthcoming. Accordingly, it negotiated a 
highly unusual arrangement under which two Green MPs 
became government spokespersons for specific areas of  
public policy (e.g. energy conservation and efficiency). The 
MPs in question were given access to ministerial advisers 
and greater access to official papers and the Cabinet policy 
process than had hitherto been the case under the ‘ordinary 
cooperation’ protocols that had applied since 1999. Against 
this, the two Green MPs had no formal responsibility for the 
portfolios in which they had a spokesperson role, and thus no 
direct accountability to Parliament.
More significant in constitutional terms was the negotiation 
of  the ‘enhanced’ confidence and supply agreements with 
New Zealand First and United Future (see Boston and 
Bullock, 2008). This development reflected Labour’s desire 
to secure a deal with New Zealand First in a context where 
the latter party had committed prior to the election to 
remaining outside the new government (and thus free of  the 
‘baubles of  office’). The outcome of  the negotiations was 
a compromise under which New Zealand First (and also 
United Future) secured a senior ministerial portfolio (albeit 
outside the Cabinet) while Labour secured a guarantee of  61 
votes on confidence and supply (thereby giving it an overall 
parliamentary majority). 
Elsewhere in the democratic world such 
an arrangement would probably have been 
classified as a ‘coalition’ deal rather than 
as a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement 
(whether ‘enhanced’ or otherwise). 
This is because in most jurisdictions the 
defining characteristic of  a ‘coalition’ is 
the participation of  two or more parties 
within the executive through the holding 
of  ministerial offices (see Strøm, Müller 
and Bergman, 2008, p.6). The question 
of  whether these offices are part of  
the Cabinet does not normally arise 
because in most jurisdictions all portfolios 
automatically carry full Cabinet status, with junior ministers 
typically having only associate or deputy roles. Note, too, that 
prior to this juncture all ‘confidence and supply’ agreements 
in New Zealand had been with ‘support’ parties, and in the 
international arena support parties are distinguished from 
coalition partners on the sole criterion that none of  their MPs 
are ‘part of  the government’ (i.e. they do not hold ministerial 
office). 
What emerged following the 2005 general election, 
therefore, was a rather curious situation in which two minor 
parties became involved directly ‘in’ the government but were 
not fully ‘of ’ the government; that is to say, they were part 
of  the ‘executive government’ but not part of  ‘the Cabinet’, 
and hence not full coalition partners with Labour (unlike the 
Progressive MP, Jim Anderton). 
Reflecting this hybrid or ‘half-way house’ arrangement, 
Labour’s ‘enhanced’ confidence and supply agreements with 
New Zealand First and United Future made provision for 
a much looser application of  the convention of  collective 
ministerial responsibility, particularly in relation to the 
principle of  Cabinet unanimity. In accordance with this 
principle, all ministers (whether members of  the Cabinet 
of  not) are required to support each and every Cabinet 
decision, regardless of  their personal views and preferences. 
... it was agreed that the two ministers concerned 
(Winston Peters and Peter Dunne) would only 
be fully bound by the convention of collective 
responsibility in the areas relevant to their 
specific portfolio responsibilities. 
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Those wishing to disassociate themselves from a particular 
decision are expected to resign, since it is neither fair nor 
reasonable that they should be permitted to enjoy the benefits 
and influence of  ministerial office without also accepting the 
consequent obligations. In its strict application, therefore, the 
unanimity principle precludes individual ministers (or groups 
of  ministers) from publicly dissenting from government 
decisions – unless the Cabinet formally agrees to permit 
disagreement. 
In practice, of  course, the unanimity principle has rarely 
been applied with absolute rigour. Moreover, in the context 
of  multi-party governments it is not uncommon for the 
various parties to ‘agree to disagree’ from time to time. In 
New Zealand, specific provisions for such disagreements were 
incorporated into the coalition deals between Labour and 
the Alliance (later the Progressives) on three occasions. The 
hybrid arrangements with New Zealand First and United 
Future, however, went considerably further. In effect, it was 
agreed that the two ministers concerned (Winston Peters and 
Peter Dunne) would only be fully bound by the convention of  
collective responsibility in the areas relevant to their specific 
portfolio responsibilities. As stated subsequently in a Cabinet 
Office circular (06/04): 
Mr Peters’ and Mr Dunne’s participation in the government 
is expressly limited to certain specified or agreed areas. 
When Mr Peters and Mr Dunne speak about the issues 
within their portfolios, they speak for the government and 
as part of  the government. When they speak about matters 
outside their portfolios, however, they may speak as political 
party leaders and MPs rather than as Ministers, and do 
not necessarily represent the government position. 
In short, under this ‘enhanced’ confidence and supply 
arrangement the leaders of  New Zealand First and 
United Future were able to participate fully in the process 
of  government while only being bound to support the 
government, whether in Parliament or more generally, in 
their respective portfolio areas.
When these ‘hybrid’ arrangements were negotiated in 
the wake of  the 2005 general election they were criticised on 
various grounds, not least their political expediency and their 
Table 2: Types of multi-party governance in New Zealand (1996–2009)
Form of governance 
arrangement
Brief description of the arrangement Examples
1 Coalition – high unity/
limited dissent
An agreement between two or more parties to form a government 
in which each party is represented within the Cabinet and where 
there is no explicit provision for the parties to disagree publicly on 
important issues.
National-NZF coalition (1996–98)
2 Coalition – provision for 
‘agree to disagree’
An agreement between two or more parties to form a government 
in which each party is represented within the Cabinet but with 
provision for the parties to ‘agree to disagree’ from time to time  
on important issues.
Labour–Alliance coalition 
(1999–02); Labour–Progressives 
coalition (2002–05); Labour 
Progressives (2005–08)
3 Enhanced confidence and 
supply 
An agreement by two or more parties to form a government in 
which the minor party secures ministerial representation, but 
outside the Cabinet, and in which the minor party minister(s) is 
only obliged to abide by the convention of collective responsibility 
in the portfolio areas for which he/she is directly responsible.
Labour–NZF (2005–08); 
Labour–United Future (2005–08); 
National-ACT (2008– ); National-
Mäori party (2008– ); National–
United Future (2008– )
4 Ordinary confidence and 
supply
An agreement by a minor party (or parties) to support a major 
party in Parliament on matters of confidence and supply in return 
for certain policy and procedural concessions.
Labour with the Greens (1999–
2002); Labour with United Future 
(2002–05)
5 Enhanced cooperation An agreement by a minor party (or parties) to work cooperatively 
with a major party on a range of policy and procedural matters 
(including a pledge not to oppose the government on matters 
of confidence and supply), in exchange for certain rights and 
resources, including the opportunity to speak for the government 
on specific issues.
Labour with the Greens (2005–
08)
6 Ordinary cooperation An agreement by a minor party (or parties) to work cooperatively 
with a major party on a range of policy and procedural matters 
(including a pledge not to oppose the government on matters of 
confidence and supply), in exchange for certain concessions.
Labour with the Greens (2002–
05)
7 Memorandum of 
understanding
An agreement by a minor (opposition) party to work with the 
government to develop policy and legislation in areas of common 
interest.
National with the Greens (2009– )
Page 58 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 5, Issue 2 – May 2009
departure from traditional notions of  collective responsibility. 
As the then leader of  the National party, Don Brash (2006, 
p.9), put it:
Essentially New Zealand now has two Ministers exercising 
powers of  government without being collectively 
responsible for the operation of  the government. They 
are no longer responsible to Parliament for the overall 
activities of  the government they represent. These 
ministers are free to enjoy the trappings of  office, while at 
the same time being free to disassociate themselves from 
the activities of  the whole of  the government from which 
they derive their status.
Given such concerns, it might have been expected that 
a National-led government would eschew arrangements of  
this kind. Instead, it firmly embraced them. Why? There 
appear to be at least three reasons. 
First, the approach instituted by Labour in 2005 was 
not generally seen as unconstitutional and did not provoke 
trenchant or widespread criticism from constitutional experts 
and media commentators (see Palmer, 2006; White, 2005). 
Admittedly, there was disquiet in some quarters about the 
propriety of  permitting certain ministers to speak regularly 
and openly against the government. But the concerns 
here were ethical and political, rather than constitutional. 
Overall, the new arrangements were seen as marking 
another pragmatic step in an ongoing evolutionary process, 
with the unanimity principle being modified yet again to 
reflect the political imperatives generated by proportional 
representation. Had there been no prior ‘agree to disagree’ 
provisions in coalition agreements, it is possible that Labour’s 
deals with New Zealand First and United Future in 2005 
would have generated more vigorous and sustained criticism. 
But, in the event, the earlier experiments with a looser 
application of  the unanimity principle had highlighted the 
malleability of  the doctrine of  collective responsibility (at 
least within certain limits) and demonstrated a willingness of  
the political community to accommodate new approaches to 
governance.
Second, the ‘enhanced’ confidence and supply 
arrangements actually worked in practice during the 2005–
08 parliamentary term – or at least tolerably well. Both New 
Zealand First and United Future welcomed the opportunity to 
participate in the government (and thus contribute to decision 
making on key issues) while having the freedom to criticise 
Labour’s policies from time to time. Equally, however, the 
leadership of  both parties recognised that there were limits 
to the frequency with which they could openly attack Labour, 
as well as political constraints on the manner and vehemence 
of  their opposition. After all, their decision to support the 
government on matters of  confidence and supply would be 
the subject of  severe criticism from National and the media 
if  they were constantly challenging Labour’s policy positions. 
In political terms, therefore, the new arrangements had in-
built check and balances – or automatic 
stabilisers. From Labour’s perspective, too, 
the arrangements with New Zealand First 
and United Future proved to be politically 
and administratively manageable. 
Admittedly, the fact that these two 
parties were outside the formal ‘coalition’ 
created greater uncertainty with respect 
to the management of  Parliament and 
the government’s legislative programme. 
Nevertheless, Labour not merely survived 
a full three-year parliamentary term, but 
also succeeded in enacting a relatively 
ambitious set of  reforms.
Third, and related to this, the experience 
of  the 2005–08 parliamentary term demonstrated that the 
‘enhanced’ confidence and supply arrangements offer a 
workable solution to one of  the key challenges of  multi-party 
governance – namely the so-called unity-distinctiveness dilemma 
(see Boston and Bullock, 2008). This dilemma arises from 
the effort to balance two conflicting political imperatives: 
on the one hand, the desire for a high degree of  inter-party 
cooperation and a unified public stance on major policy 
issues in the interests of  effective, durable and responsible 
government; and on the other hand, the desire to facilitate 
a degree of  inter-party differentiation in the interests 
of  protecting the distinct identity (and hence political 
viability) of  the minor party (or parties) directly involved 
in the government. But if  the ‘enhanced’ confidence and 
supply arrangements during 2005–08 provided a politically 
convenient and workable compromise, they did not, in the 
end, prevent the parties involved (i.e. Labour, New Zealand 
First and United Future) suffering significant electoral losses 
in 2008 (see Table 1). Indeed, of  the four minor parties that 
negotiated some kind of  governance arrangement with 
Labour during these years, only the Greens increased their 
share of  the party vote.
Notwithstanding this outcome, the ‘enhanced’ confidence 
and supply arrangements were regarded by the key 
participants as relatively successful, and certainly preferable 
to the main alternatives – namely a formal coalition of  some 
kind or ‘ordinary’ confidence and supply arrangements. 
The leader of  United Future, Peter Dunne, was particularly 
keen on the ‘enhanced’ approach, and was instrumental in 
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persuading National’s leader (John Key) and deputy leader 
(Bill English) of  its merits. Hence, when National came to 
negotiate with potential allies in November 2008, it soon 
became apparent that Labour’s innovative arrangements 
(albeit with some minor adjustments) were the favoured 
approach of  the principal players. It also became evident that 
negotiating broadly similar arrangements with ACT, United 
Future and the Mäori Party offered a way of  treating each 
party on equal terms, thereby avoiding the potential inter-
party conflicts that might arise from a governing construct 
based on asymmetrical relationships. 
Accordingly, a novel solution to the highly unusual political 
circumstances following the 2005 election has now become 
an accepted, and indeed favoured, approach in New Zealand 
for fashioning multi-party governance under proportional 
representation. And thus far the ‘enhanced’ confidence and 
supply arrangements negotiated by National appear to be 
working as successfully as they did for Labour. This does not 
mean, of  course, that such governance arrangements are 
destined to become the norm. Much will no doubt depend 
on the evolving character of  New Zealand’s party system 
(including the likelihood that the number of  parliamentary 
parties will decline from the current seven to around five3), 
the particular political constraints and imperatives generated 
by future elections, and the possibility of  further changes to 
the electoral system.
In the meantime, perhaps the real puzzle in all this is why 
similar governance arrangements have not been adopted in 
other multi-party systems, particularly those with a much 
longer tradition of  proportional representation than New 
Zealand. After all, if  such arrangements provide a relatively 
effective and workable solution (under certain conditions) to 
the unity-distinctiveness dilemma, why have they not found 
expression elsewhere? One possibility is that New Zealand’s 
flexible constitutional arrangements and distinctive political 
culture, including a tradition of  pragmatism, have enabled 
it to experiment in ways that other multi-party democracies 
would find more difficult. Another reason may reside in New 
Zealand’s particular form of  multi-dimensionality (see Box 
1). Whatever the reason, it will be interesting to observe over 
the coming years whether New Zealand’s novel governance 
arrangements are replicated elsewhere or whether they 
remain unique to this particular democracy.
1 Various people provided useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I would 
particularly like to thank David Bullock and Colin James for their constructive criticisms and 
helpful advice.
2 Even so, it did not entail the complete replacement of the parties represented within the 
executive because the leader of United Future, Peter Dunne, retained his ministerial position.
3 For instance, it is unlikely that either United Future or the Progressives will survive the next 
election.
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